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Abstract
The empirical DSGE (dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) literature pays surprisingly
little attention to the behavior of the monetary authority. Alternative policy rule
specifications abound, but their relative merit is rarely discussed. We contribute to filling
this gap by comparing the fit of a large set of interest rate rules (fifty-five in total), which
we estimate within a simple New Keynesian model. We find that specifications in which
monetary policy responds to inflation and to deviations of output from its efficient level--
the one that would prevail in the absence of distortions--have the worst fit within the set
we consider. Policies that respond to measures of the output gap based on statistical filters
perform better, but the best-fitting rules are those that also track the evolution of the
model-consistent efficient real interest rate.
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Most central banks have a dual mandate: stabilize in￿ ation and real activity. This dual
mandate is explicit and symmetric in the United States, where the Federal Reserve Act
instructs the Federal Reserve to ￿...promote e⁄ectively the goals of maximum employment,￿
and ￿stable prices.￿But even in in￿ ation targeting countries, whose formal mandates tend
to focus on in￿ ation, the implementation of monetary policy usually involves balancing this
objective with the stabilization of a real criterion. ￿In practice, in￿ ation targeting is never
￿ strict￿in￿ ation targeting but always ￿ ￿ exible￿in￿ ation targeting...￿ , according to Svensson
(2007):
And yet, while the interpretation of the price stability mandate has become increasingly
transparent and uniform around the world, the real stability objective typically remains vague.
This lack of clarity re￿ ects in part the absence of a consensus in the academic literature and
among policymakers. Economists agree that in￿ ation should be low and stable, but they do
not share an operational de￿nition of a real target for monetary policy. In applied contexts,
full employment (also known as ￿potential￿ ) output has been traditionally de￿ned as a smooth
trend for GDP, often measured through some ￿ltering or de-trending procedure.1 From a
more theoretical perspective, the New Keynesian literature suggests that output should be
stabilized around its e¢ cient level, i.e. the level that would prevail in the absence of nominal
distortions (Woodford, 2003).2 Unfortunately, these two notions of potential output ￿one
purely statistical, the other purely theoretical ￿can di⁄er quite signi￿cantly since the latter
incorporates the e¢ cient response of the economy to shocks and might thus be far from
smooth.3
The absence of a standard de￿nition of the real objective of monetary policy is not only
relevant in normative contexts. For example, in the last few years, empirical dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have incorporated ever more detailed and realistic
1Orphanides and Van Norden (2002) review several of these statistical procedures. Growth accounting
represents another popular approach to the measurement of potential output as a smooth trend (see CBO,
2001).
2A third approach to the measurement of potential output, which is intermediate between the two described
above, involves positing a statistical relationship between in￿ ation and the output gap (a Phillips curve).
This relationship then forms the basis for a multivariate Kalman ￿lter to extract potential output (see for
example Kuttner, 1994, and Laubach and Williams, 2003). Mishkin (2007) provides an excellent survey of
various statistical and model-based methods for the estimation of potential output and discusses their policy
implications.
3For example, in an estimated DSGE model with several frictions, Edge, Kiley and Laforte (2007) ￿nd
that the time series of e¢ cient output does not resemble much the more traditional potential output derived
within FRB/US. Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2011) reach the opposite conclusion comparing the
e¢ cient output in their model with an HP trend.
1descriptions of private sector behavior and of the monetary transmission mechanism, follow-
ing the seminal work of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2007). In terms of modeling the monetary authority, though, most studies simply posit an
interest rate feedback rule broadly inspired by Taylor (1993), usually with no discussion of
its details and of potential alternatives. As a result, we have witnessed a proliferation of
estimated policy rules, especially with respect to the speci￿cation of the real variables the
central bank reacts to, but with very little guidance on their positive or normative merit.4
This paper attempts to impose some order on this wilderness by comparing the ￿t of
a large set of interest rate rules within an estimated, small scale DSGE model of the U.S.
economy. Most of the rules we consider have previously appeared in the literature. Others,
including the best ￿tting ones, have not.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we show how to integrate statistical measures
of the output gap (in particular those obtained through ￿ltering) into a general equilibrium
model. The idea, which we adapt from Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003), is to use the DSGE
model as a forecasting (and backcasting) device to construct a two-sided version of the ￿lter,
in which the model￿ s forecasts substitute the realized forward values of the variable of interest
(here GDP). This ￿lter produces a real-time measure of a ￿statistical￿output gap, which at
the same time is one of the endogenous variables in the DSGE model.
In the second step of the analysis, we assemble a catalog of interest rate rules of the general
form
it = ￿it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿ct + ￿￿ (￿t ￿ ￿￿
t) + ￿xxt] (1)
where it is the Federal Funds Rate, ￿ct is a potentially time-varying intercept, ￿t ￿ ￿￿
t is
the deviation of in￿ ation from a target value, which can also be time-varying, and xt is
the output gap. As a baseline, we adopt a simple speci￿cation with constant intercept and
in￿ ation target, and with the e¢ cient output gap as the measure of economic slack.
We then consider a few alternative classes of policies, each with several variants, for a
total of 55 estimated rules. For example, one alternative class of policies replaces the e¢ cient
output gap with a statistical measure, with variants corresponding to di⁄erent types of ￿lters.
This set of rules is designed to be close to those estimated in empirical analyses of monetary
4For a recent normative analysis of alternative simple interest rate rules within a calibrated DSGE model
see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007): Svensson (2003) recommends modeling central banks as optimizing
agents that maximize an objective function, as customary for the private sector, rather than as automatons
committed to an interest rate feedback rule. The optimal targeting rule obtained in this framework, however,
still depends on the arguments of the loss function policymakers are assumed to minimize. See Adolfson,
LasØen, LindØ and Svensson (2008) for a state-of-the-art implementation of this approach within a DSGE
model for Sweden.
2policy behavior based on partial information estimation methods, which tend to measure
slack as the deviation of GDP from a smooth trend (e.g. Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler, 2000;
Judd and Rudebusch, 1998; English, Nelson and Sack, 2003 and the survey by Orphanides,
2003). Another class of policies we examine allows the intercept ￿ct to move over time. In
particular, we study speci￿cations in which the monetary authority tracks the evolution of an
￿equilibrium￿real interest rate ￿the real rate that would maintain the economy at potential.
These policy rules echo Wicksell￿ s suggestion that a ￿natural￿rate of return determined by
real factors represents a useful target for monetary policy (Woodford, 2003) ￿an idea familiar
to Fed policymakers at least since the early 1990s (e.g. Greenspan, 1993). However, to our
knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst to estimate interest rate rules consistent with this idea.5
Finally, in the third step of the analysis, we embed each of the candidate interest rate
rules within a DSGE framework with given tastes and technology. We estimate the resulting
set of models with Bayesian methods and compare their ￿t using marginal data densities.6
The objective of this exercise is not necessarily to pick the best ￿tting rule, and discard all
others, but rather to identify a class of policies that o⁄er the best promise to account for
the behavior of the data and, perhaps more importantly, weed out those whose ￿t is clearly
inferior.
We can summarize the main results as follows. First, and to our surprise, the baseline
rule ranks 47th in terms of ￿t, out of the 55 rules we have estimated. Moreover, the evidence
against this speci￿cation is very strong, according to our model evaluation criterion (Kass
and Raftery, 1995). Second, the ￿t of the model improves signi￿cantly when we resort to a
statistical ￿lter to measure slack in the policy rule. In this context, the quarterly HP ￿lter
performs particularly well.
Third, the ￿t improves further when we let the intercept of the policy rule track the
e¢ cient rate of interest, the one that would prevail in the economy with no distortions. In
fact, this measure of the equilibrium interest rate is a better proxy for the real economic
developments, to which monetary policy seems to respond, than any of the several measures
of output gap we have experimented with. This is the main result of the paper, which sets
it apart from the large literature on the estimation of Taylor rules with partial information
techniques. It takes a complete general equilibrium model, in fact, to compute equilibrium
5Trehan and Wu (2007) discuss the biases in the reduced-form estimation of policy rules with a constant
intercept, when in fact the central bank responds to a time-varying equilibrium real rate, but do not estimate
this response.
6An and Schorfheide (2007) provide a comprehensive survey of the application of Bayesian methods to the
estimation and comparison of DSGE models. Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) use these methods to estimate
the response of monetary policy to exchange rate movements in several small open economies.
3measures of the interest rate of the kind analyzed here.
Fourth, policy rules with a slowly evolving in￿ ation target perform best, since this target
captures some of the low frequency variation in in￿ ation and the nominal interest rate that is
evident even in our relatively short sample (1987Q3 to 2009Q3). However, this improvement
in ￿t comes at the cost of introducing one more exogenous process into the model, even if
one with a clear economic interpretation. Therefore, we take the empirical success of this
speci￿cation as an indication that more research is needed to understand the low frequency
movements in nominal variables, rather than a re￿ ection of the actual behavior of the Federal
Reserve.
Fifth, all these results survive when we embed the most representative policy rules of each
class within the medium-scale DSGE model of Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010),
estimated on the same set of observables as in our baseline speci￿cation.
Overall, these ￿ndings suggest that the speci￿cation of the interest rate rule can have a
signi￿cant impact on the ￿t of DSGE models. In our baseline small-scale model, the gap
in marginal likelihoods between the best and worst ￿tting rules is about ￿fty log-points
and reaches eighty log-points in the medium-scale model, which is on the order of magnitude
arising from the inclusion and exclusion of stochastic volatility in a similar model (Cœrdia, Del
Negro and Greenwald, 2011). This evidence underscores the importance for DSGE researchers
to pay signi￿cantly more attention to the speci￿cation of monetary policy than common
practice to date.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents our model of private
sector behavior, together with the baseline interest rate rule. Section 3 discusses the econo-
metric methodology and the estimation results for the baseline model. Section 4 introduces
the alternative classes of policy rules we consider and compares their empirical performance.
Section 5 concludes.
2 A Simple Model of the Monetary Transmission Mechanism
We augment the purely forward-looking textbook New Keynesian framework (Woodford,
2003) with two sources of inertia, to improve its ability to ￿t the data. On the demand side,
we include habits in consumption in the utility speci￿cation. On the supply side, we allow
for partial indexation to past in￿ ation of the subset of prices that are not reoptimized in each
period.
The resulting model is smaller than the workhorse empirical DSGE model of Smets and
Wouters (2007). It abstracts from capital accumulation and the attending frictions ￿such as
4endogenous utilization and investment adjustment costs ￿and from non-competitive features
in the labor market ￿such as monopolistic competition and sticky wages. This modeling
choice allows us to estimate and compare the ￿t of as many interest rate rules as we like ￿55
in the current version, and a multiple of this number if we consider various revisions ￿without
having to worry about computational constraints. This is an important consideration for our
exercise, given the very large number of policy speci￿cations found in the literature, many of
which we have not (yet) considered.
The remainder of this section presents the linearized equilibrium conditions of the model,
which constitute the basis for estimation. Appendix A contains details of the model￿ s mi-
crofoundations, including the mapping of the tastes and technology parameters into those of
the approximate log-linear equations.
2.1 Private Sector
An Euler equation summarizes the demand side of the model
￿t = Et￿t+1 + (it ￿ Et￿t+1) ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ Et￿t+1;
where ￿t is the marginal utility of real income, it is the (continuously compounded) nominal
interest rate and ￿t is in￿ ation, while ￿t and ￿t are the (exogenous) growth rate of total
factor productivity and a shock to consumers￿impatience, both distributed as stationary
AR(1) processes. All variables are expressed as log deviations from their balanced growth
paths. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is restricted to unity because we assume
logarithmic utility.
Manipulating this Euler equation, we can obtain the gap representation
~ xt = Et~ xt+1 ￿ ’￿1
￿ (it ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ re
t): (2)
Here, re














is a distributed lag of the e¢ cient output gap xe
t ￿ yt ￿ ye
t, where yt is output and ye
t is its
e¢ cient counterpart. The lead-lag structure in the de￿nition of ~ xt re￿ ects the presence of
internal habits in consumption, to a degree indexed by the parameter ￿￿:
The e¢ cient output ye
t is an important construct in what follows. It represents the level
of aggregate output that would prevail in equilibrium if prices were, and always had been,
























from which we observe that ye
t is a linear combination of the past and future expected values
of the productivity and intertemporal taste shocks alone. This observation implies that the
counterfactual environment in which prices are ￿ exible is a parallel universe, which evolves
independently from the outcomes observed in the actual economy. In this parallel universe,
the intertemporal Euler equation implies
re







where we used the production function and the intratemporal e¢ ciency condition (i.e. mar-
ginal rate of substitution equal to marginal product of labor) to map the e¢ cient marginal
utility of consumption ￿e
t into output ye
t.
Turning now to the supply side of the model, the optimal pricing decisions of ￿rms produce
a Phillips curve of the form
~ ￿t = ￿ (!xe
t + ’~ xt) + ￿Et~ ￿t+1 + ut; (4)
where
~ ￿t ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿￿t￿1
depends on the degree of indexation to past in￿ ation, parametrized by ￿; and ut is an AR(1)
cost-push shock, generated by exogenous ￿ uctuations in desired markups. These ￿ uctuations
are the only source of a tradeo⁄ between in￿ ation and real activity in this model.
Without markup shocks, the e¢ cient level of aggregate production can be achieved to-
gether with price stability (i.e. ￿t = 0), as we can see by substituting ut = 0 and yt = ye
t;
or xe
t = 0; 8t in equation (4). This is the ￿rst best outcome in this economy, since no price
needs to change when aggregate in￿ ation is zero, thus eliminating price dispersion across
monopolistic producers and the distortions in the allocation of resources associated with it
(Woodford, 2003). When markup shocks are present, on the contrary, the e¢ cient allocation
is no longer feasible, because the e¢ cient level of aggregate output could only be achieved
by allowing cost-push shocks to pass-through to in￿ ation entirely, as we can see by solving
6equation (4) forward with yt = ye
t 8t
￿t = ￿￿t￿1 +
P1
s=0 ￿sEtut+s:
The resulting ￿ uctuations in in￿ ation would then produce an ine¢ cient dispersion of prices
and production levels across varieties. At the other extreme of the policy spectrum, perfect
in￿ ation stabilization would require cost-push shocks to show-through entirely in deviations
of output from its e¢ cient level. Optimal policy, therefore, will distribute the impact of
these shocks between output and in￿ ation, as to balance the objectives of price stability and
e¢ cient aggregate production.
One implication of this trade-o⁄ is that an ex-ante real interest rate, it ￿ Et￿t+1; set to
perfectly shadow the e¢ cient rate of return re
t; would not be optimal, although the Euler
equation (2) implies that such a policy would close the output gap every period and thus
achieve the e¢ cient level of aggregate production. This is the main reason for including some
feedback from in￿ ation and the output gap even in the interest rate rules that include re
t in
their intercept, as we do below.7
2.2 Monetary Policy: Baseline Speci￿cation
In the baseline policy speci￿cation, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate in response
to the current in￿ ation rate and e¢ cient output gap, with a certain degree of inertia
it = ￿it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿￿t + ￿xxe
t) + "i
t: (5)
Expression (5) represents a natural starting point for our comparative analysis, since it brings
the basic ingredients of the empirical literature on interest rate rules into the context of our
DSGE framework. In￿ ation and real activity are standard arguments of monetary policy
rules at least since Taylor (1993), while interest rate inertia typically improves their ability
to ￿t the data, as shown for example by Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler (2000). We choose the
e¢ cient output gap as the baseline policy measure of real economic developments for internal
consistency with the rest of our theoretical apparatus. In our model, in fact, this gap is both
the fundamental driver of in￿ ation, as shown in equation (4), as well as the measure of slack
that is relevant for welfare analysis (e.g. Woodford, 2003).
7Another reason is that a policy rule of the form it = r
e
t + Et￿t+1 would not deliver the e¢ cient output
uniquely, since the nominal interest rate does not respond more than one-to-one to expected in￿ ation (e.g.
Clarida, Gal￿ and Gertler, 1999):
73 Inference
We estimate the model laid out in the previous section, and all the variants discussed below,
with Bayesian methods, as surveyed for example by An and Schorfheide (2007). Bayesian
estimation combines prior information on the parameters with the likelihood function of the
model, to form a posterior density function. We construct the likelihood using the Kalman
￿lter based on the state space representation of the rational expectations solution of each
model under consideration, assuming a likelihood of zero for the parameter values that imply
indeterminacy. The observation equations are
￿logGDPt = ￿ + yt ￿ yt￿1 + ￿t
￿logPCEt = ￿￿ + ￿t
FFRt = r + ￿￿ + it;
where ￿ is the ￿rst di⁄erence operator, GDPt is real GDP, PCEt is the core PCE de￿ ator
ex food and energy, and FFRt is the average e⁄ective Federal Funds rate, all sampled at a
quarterly frequency. The constants in these equations represent the average growth rate of
productivity, ￿, the long run in￿ ation target, ￿￿, and the average real interest rate, r. The
sample period runs from 1987:Q3 to 2009:Q3, although the main results are not a⁄ected by
truncating the sample at 2008:Q4, when the Federal Funds rate ￿rst hit the zero bound. We
start the sample with Alan Greenspan￿ s tenure as Fed chairmanship because, starting with
Taylor (1993), there seems to be general agreement that interest rate setting appropriately
characterizes U.S. monetary policy during this period.
The left panel of Table 1 reports our choice of the priors, which are maintained across all
the model speci￿cations we consider. On the demand side, we calibrate the discount factor
as ￿ = 0:99; and impose a loose prior between zero and one on the habit coe¢ cient ￿, only
slightly favoring higher values. These two parameters, together with the average balanced








where ￿￿ ￿ ￿e￿￿:
On the supply side, the prior on the indexation parameter ￿ is centered around 0:6; but
is quite dispersed over the unit interval. The slope of the Phillips curve is a convolution of
deep parameters, ￿ ￿
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿(1+!￿) ; where ￿ is the fraction of ￿rms that do not change their
price in any given period, ￿ is the elasticity of demand faced by each monopolistic producer
and ! is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Only the slope ￿ can be identi￿ed from
our observables. We formulate our prior on this parameter as a Gamma distribution with
mean 0:1. This value is somewhat higher than the partial information estimates of the New
8Keynesian Phillips curve (e.g. Gal￿ and Gertler, 1999, Sbordone, 2002), but is consistent with
the low degree of price stickiness found in microeconomic studies such as Bils and Klenow
(2004), given reasonable values for ! and ￿.8
Turning now to the interest rate rule, the prior on the smoothing parameter ￿ follows a
Beta distribution centered at 0:7; with a 90% probability interval wide enough to encompass
most existing estimates. The priors for the feedback coe¢ cients on in￿ ation and real activity
are normally distributed with means 1:5 and 0:5 respectively, as in the original Taylor (1993)
rule.
The autocorrelations of the exogenous shocks, the ￿i￿ s in the table (for each shock i), have
Beta prior distributions with mean 0:5; while the standard deviations, denoted by ￿i, have
Inverse Gamma prior distributions centered at 0:5.
We obtain the posterior mode and inverse Hessian by minimizing the negative of the log
posterior density function and use Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods, more speci￿cally a
Random Walk Metropolis algorithm, to build a representative sample of the parameters￿joint
posterior distribution. We monitor the convergence of the chains of draws in each step using
a variety of tests. Finally, upon convergence, we combine the chains in the last step, after
discarding the initial 25% of the draws in each chain, to form a full sample of the posterior
distribution, which represents the source of our inference information.9
To evaluate the ￿t of di⁄erent policy rules, we compare the marginal data densities, or
posterior probabilities, of the DSGE models in which the rules are embedded, using Geweke￿ s
(1999) modi￿ed harmonic mean estimator. In particular, we compute the log of the Bayes
factor (multiplied by two) of each alternative model against the baseline. Kass and Raftery
(1995) recommend this measure of relative ￿t since its scale is the same as a classic Likelihood
Ratio statistic.10 This procedure results in an overall ranking of the interest rate rules under
consideration, as well as in a measure of their individual ￿t against a common benchmark,
and thus implicitly against each other.
8For example, with ! = 1 and ￿ = 8; which corresponds to a desired markup of 14%, ￿ = 0:1 implies
￿ = 0:4; or an expected duration of prices of about ￿ve months.
9Detailed convergence and inference analysis for each speci￿cation discussed in the paper is available upon
request.
10The Bayes factor of model 1 against model 2 is the ratio of their marginal likelihoods. Kass and Raftery
(1995) suggest that values of 2logBF above 10 can be considered very strong evidence in favor of model 1.
Values between 6 and 10 represent strong evidence, between 2 and 6 postive evidence, while values below 2
are ￿not worth more than a bare mention.￿We refer to this statistic as the KR criterion.
93.1 Estimation Results in the Baseline Model
The right panel of Table 1 reports selected moments of the marginal posterior distributions
of the parameters under the baseline interest rate rule. Although the data are quite informa-
tive on most parameters, and many of the posterior estimates fall within reasonable ranges,
close inspection of the results also reveals some anomalies with this speci￿cation. To better
visualize these anomalies, Figure 1 graphs the prior and posterior marginal distributions for
the group of problematic parameters.
First, note that the posterior estimate of the slope of the Phillips curve, ￿; is minuscule,
with a mean of 0:002; two orders of magnitude smaller than the prior mean and at the extreme
lower edge of the available estimates in the DSGE literature (see for example the survey by
Schorfheide, 2008). This posterior estimate implies that there is no discernible trade-o⁄
between in￿ ation and real activity, and that in￿ ation is close to an exogenous process driven
by movements in desired markups. As a consequence, there is little hope of distinguishing
between dynamic in￿ ation indexation and persistent markup shocks, as drivers of the observed
in￿ ation persistence. This lack of identi￿cation is re￿ ected in the bimodal marginal posterior
distributions of the parameters ￿ and ￿u, which are generated by MCMC draws with high ￿
and low ￿u, or vice versa, and that correspond to local peaks of the joint posterior density of
similar heights. Finally, the last two panels of Figure 1 show that the estimated parameters
of the interest rate rule imply a strong reaction of policy to the output gap, and an extremely
weak reaction to in￿ ation, with about half of the posterior draws for ￿￿ below one. These
values are puzzling, in light of the large literature that has argued that a forceful reaction to
in￿ ation has been one of the hallmarks of U.S. monetary policy since the mid-eighties.
The anomalies of the posterior distribution highlighted above reduce the baseline model￿ s
marginal data density and contribute to its extremely poor overall ￿t. For now, we are not in
a position to quantify the extent of this empirical failure since we have not yet introduced an
alternative model, but we can say that the baseline speci￿cation ranks 47th in terms marginal
likelihood among the 55 evaluated in this version of the paper.
4 Evaluating Alternative Interest Rate Rules
Many aspects of our baseline model could be problematic. In the rest of the paper, we focus
on one potential source of these problems, which in our judgement has been largely, and
surprisingly, overlooked in the DSGE literature: the speci￿cation of the interest rate rule.
As we will see, relatively minor adjustments to the policy rule compared to the baseline
speci￿cation can improve the ￿t of our simple DSGE model dramatically, at the same time
10contributing to solve some of the anomalous estimates and identi￿cation problems highlighted
in Figure 1.11
4.1 Statistical Output Gaps
The measure of economic slack that we chose to include in the baseline interest rate rule is
the deviation of GDP from its e¢ cient level. This choice is fairly common in DSGE work
(e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007); although far from universal. One drawback is that this
approach makes the resulting policy rule impossible to compare with those estimated in the
vast literature that employs partial information econometric techniques, since the construc-
tion of the counterfactual e¢ cient output requires a general equilibrium model. Moreover,
the e¢ cient output gap might be considered an implausible choice as a summary statistic
for policymakers￿views on the level of resource utilization, precisely because of its model
dependency.
To bridge the gap between our general equilibrium framework and the work based on
single equation methods, we begin our catalog of alternative policy rules with speci￿cations
in which the output gap is measured through statistical ￿lters. In particular, we focus on the
Hodrick and Prescott (HP) ￿lter as a tool to construct smooth versions of potential output,
given its popularity in applied macroeconomics.12
One di¢ culty in making the HP ￿lter operational within a DSGE model is that its ideal
representation is a two-sided, in￿nite moving average, whose standard approximation to ￿nite
samples requires di⁄erent coe¢ cients on the observations at the beginning, in the middle, and
at the end of the sample. Such a pattern of coe¢ cients is di¢ cult to replicate within a dynamic
system of rational expectation equations with a parsimonious state space. To circumvent this
problem, we adapt the methodology proposed by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) for the
approximation of ideal band pass ￿lters. Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) suggest to use
forecasts (and backcasts) from an auxiliary time-series model ￿in their case a simple unit
root process ￿to extend the sample in the past and in the future. In our implementation
of their idea, the auxiliary model that generates the dummy observations is the linearized
DSGE itself.
This approach is particularly convenient for our purposes because it produces a very
11We do not address directly here the extent to which di⁄erent policy rules aid or hinder the identi￿cation of
the model￿ s parameters, although this issue would deserve further scrutiny. For a recent study of identi￿cation
in DSGEs, see Canova and Sala (2009), who ￿nd that identi￿cation is often problematic in this class of models.
12See Orphanides and van Norden (2002) for a comprehensive survey of the use of statistical ￿lters as
measures of the output gap and of their pitfalls.
11parsimonious recursive expression for the DSGE-HP gap
h




t = ￿(1 ￿ L)2 (1 ￿ F)
2 yt; (6)
where the operators L and F are de￿ned by Lyt = yt￿1 and Fyt = Etyt+1, and the smoothing
parameter ￿ is set at the typical quarterly value of 1600. This expression can thus be added
to the system of rational expectations equations that de￿nes the equilibrium of the model.
Of course, the time series for the output gap obtained through this procedure will not be the
same as the one produced by the ￿nite sample approximation usually employed in applied
work. However, it has a very similar ￿ avor, as we will see shortly. More details on the
derivation of equation 6 and on its interpretation, together with some background on linear
￿ltering, can be found in the Appendix.
When we estimate the model by replacing the e¢ cient output gap with xHP
t in the in-
terest rate rule, the marginal likelihood increases by about 10 log-points, or 21:6 points on
the KR criterion. This improvement represents very strong evidence in favor of the latter
speci￿cation. For some insight into this result, Figure 2 reports prior and posterior marginal
distributions for the same parameters we highlighted as anomalous in the baseline model. Al-
though the slope of the Phillips curve remains extremely low, its mean is now twice as large
as before (0:004 vs 0:002). Moreover, the posterior points to a small indexation coe¢ cient (￿)
and to relatively little persistence in the cost-push shock (￿u), with no immediate evidence
of identi￿cation problems. Finally, the feedback coe¢ cients on in￿ ation and the output gap
in the Taylor rule are closer to more typical values, although ￿￿ remains on the low side.
Another interesting posterior object in this model is the distribution of the time-series for
the DSGE-HP output gap, which is depicted in Figure 3, together with the standard ￿nite
sample approximation of the HP ￿lter, denoted by Data-HP, and the output gap computed
using the measure of potential output produced by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce (CBO).
The two HP approximations co-move fairly closely, although far from perfectly. In particular,
the dips in the DSGE-based approximation around the NBER recessions, which are shaded
in grey, are more pronounced than in the standard HP. In fact, the DSGE-HP conveys a view
of the timing and extent of expansions and recessions over our sample period very similar
to that of the CBO output gap (at least in two of the three recessions experienced over the
sample period). Overall, this evidence supports our use of the DSGE-HP ￿lter as an e⁄ective
de-trending tool, which produces a measure of capacity utilization similar to those often used
in single-equation estimates of the Taylor rule.
Given the promising empirical performance of the quarterly HP output gap as an argu-
ment of the model￿ s interest rate rule, we explored several alternative ￿lter formulations. In
12particular, we consider HP ￿lters in which the smoothing parameter ￿ is either estimated,
with a very di⁄used prior centered at somewhat higher values than 1600, or calibrated to a
￿high￿value of ￿ = 160000. The motivation for both these speci￿cations is to test the data￿ s
appetite for a smoother trend than in the baseline HP, closer to those obtained through the
production function approach, for example by the CBO (2001). In addition, we evaluate
models with simpler, one-sided ￿lters, such as the exponential ￿lter13
h




t = ~ ￿(1 ￿ L)yt;
the four quarter moving average of GDP growth (yt ￿ yt￿4)=4 and its simple quarterly growth
rate ￿yt:
The impact on the model￿ s ￿t of using these alternative de-trending methods to measure
the output gap in the interest rate rule are summarized in Panel I of Table 2. This table
reports the log marginal likelihood of all the model speci￿cations we have estimated, together
with twice the log Bayes factor for each model against the baseline (the KR statistic). More-
over, in the ￿rst column of the table, we report the ranking of each model, from the best to
the worst ￿tting. Column two reports a shortcut with which we sometimes refer to the rules
in the text, while column three describes each rule in mathematical notation, focusing on its
long-run arguments (i.e. ignoring interest rate smoothing). For example, the baseline model,
whose long-run arguments are ￿￿￿t + ￿xxe
t; has a logML of ￿379; which makes it number
47 in terms of ￿t out of the 55 rules we estimated in this paper.
From the table, we see that the DSGE-HP ￿lter with ￿ = 1600 produces the best ￿t
among the models with a statistical output gap. The evidence in favor of this speci￿cation
(model HP in the table) against the baseline is very strong, as we already pointed out. The
model in which the HP smoothing parameter is estimated (HP^ ￿) does only slightly worse.
The reason is that the posterior distribution of this parameter has a median of about 1100
(and the posterior distribution concentrates around this level), which produces a gap almost
identical to ￿ = 1600. The performance of all the other ￿lters, on the contrary, is clearly
inferior, although most of them ￿t better than the baseline speci￿cation.
Finally, to round up our exploration of the role of the output gap in the policy rule, Table
2 reports results for two more speci￿cations. The ￿rst one follows Smets and Wouters (2007)
(model SW), which also includes a term in the growth rate of the e¢ cient gap. The second
one is a ￿control￿ , in which the output gap is excluded altogether, and the federal funds rate
13In one version of the exponential ￿lter we set the smoothing parameter to ~ ￿ = 61:5; to match the gain of
the HP ￿lter at frequency ! = 2￿=32; which corresponds to an eight year cycle (King and Rebelo, 1993). We
also consider a version where ~ ￿ is estimated, with a prior centered at the same value as above.
13only responds to in￿ ation (NoGap). Smets and Wouter￿ s (2007) rule performs signi￿cantly
better than the baseline, which probably explains the somewhat unusual inclusion of the
growth rate of the output gap in the ￿rst place. In fact, the ￿t of this rule is very close to
that of the HP rule, although it is still in the lower half of the overall ranking.
On the contrary, the restriction ￿x = 0 is strongly rejected by the data, leading to a
signi￿cant deterioration in ￿t even with respect to the baseline. This result con￿rms that
the identi￿cation of a good indicator of real economic developments is a crucial factor in
the search for a parsimonious, but reasonably accurate, description of the behavior of the
policy rate. Our results so far suggest that common measures of de-trended output, such
as those obtained through the HP ￿lter, are more likely to represent such an indicator than
the ￿ exible-price gap consistent with the structure of the DSGE model. In the next section,
we move the search for this indicator further, by exploring the properties of an alternative
￿ exible-price construct implied by our general equilibrium model: the e¢ cient real interest
rate.
4.2 Tracking the E¢ cient Real Interest Rate
The idea that an ￿equilibrium￿interest rate (EIR) might represent a useful reference point for
monetary policy was familiar to Federal Reserve policymakers well before Woodford (2003) re-
vitalized its Wicksellian roots. For example, in his Humphrey Hawkins testimony to Congress
in May 1993, Chairman Alan Greenspan stated that ￿...In assessing real rates, the central
issue is their relationship to an equilibrium interest rate, speci￿cally, the real rate level that,
if maintained, would keep the economy at its production potential over time. Rates persisting
above that level, history tells us, tend to be associated with slack, disin￿ ation, and economic
stagnation ￿below that level with eventual resource bottlenecks and rising in￿ ation, which
ultimately engenders economic contraction. Maintaining the real rate around its equilib-
rium level should have a stabilizing e⁄ect on the economy, directing production toward its
long-term potential￿(Greenspan, 1993).14
In this section, we investigate the extent to which Chairman Greenspan￿ s reasoning had
a measurable impact on the evolution of the observed nominal interest rate over our sample.
To measure the EIR within our DSGE model, we follow the Chairman￿ s description and
compute the counterfactual ￿real rate level that, if maintained, would keep the economy
at its production potential over time.￿When ￿potential￿output is de￿ned as the e¢ cient
14Quantitative measures of the EIR are a regular input in the monetary policy debate at the Federal Reserve,
as demonstrated by the fact that a chart with a range of estimates of the EIR is included in most published
Bluebooks at least since May 2001 (see http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc_historical.htm).
14aggregate level of production, ye
t, the EIR is the e¢ cient rate of return re
t. This is our
preferred measure of the EIR, since it is grounded in the microeconomic structure of the
DSGE model. However, we also consider the equilibrium real rates that correspond to the
potential outputs implied by the HP and exponential ￿lters.15 We then embed these measures
of the EIR, which we generically denote by r￿
t, in a class of policy rules of the form
it = ￿it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)[r￿
t + ￿￿￿t + ￿xxt] + "i
t; (7)
where we consider several permutations in the de￿nitions of both r￿
t and xt.
The ￿rst rule in this class that we consider uses the DSGE￿ s e¢ cient equilibrium as its
notion of potential, so that r￿
t ￿ re
t and xt ￿ xe
t. This choice of arguments for the policy rule
improves the model￿ s marginal likelihood by approximately 20 log-points with respect to the
baseline speci￿cation and by 10 log-points with respect to the best ￿tting rule among those
discussed in the previous section. These di⁄erences represent very strong evidence in favor
of policy rules that allow a gradual adjustment of the nominal interest rate to movements in
the e¢ cient real rate. To our knowledge, this paper is the ￿rst to document this evidence,
although policymakers have been discussing the equilibrium real rate as a potentially useful
indicator for monetary policy for a long time, as witnessed by Chairman Greenspan￿ s remarks
above (see also Amato, 2005). This speci￿cation gains even more importance in light of the
current macroeconomic situation. In a model with credit frictions, Cœrdia and Woodford
(2009) show that movements in spreads induce ￿ uctuations in the e¢ cient real interest rate.
In this environment, interest rate rules that track the e¢ cient real rate typically display
desirable stabilization properties, a result that generalizes to a broader class of models (Gal￿
and Gertler, 2007).
Panel II of Table 2 shows that the Re speci￿cation, the one that is probably most appealing
on theoretical grounds, is also preferred by the data over the others in the same class, although
in some cases only slightly. For example, the di⁄erences in ￿t with some of the speci￿cations
in which the output gap is measured through statistical ￿lters, rather than in deviation from
the DSGE￿ s e¢ cient output, are minor.
On the other hand, the deterioration in ￿t is more signi￿cant when we restrict the feedback
coe¢ cient on the output gap, ￿x, to zero, as in model ReNoGap. This result suggests that re
t
is not a su¢ cient statistic for the real developments in the economy that drive the movements
in the federal funds rate. However, there is strong evidence in favor of re
t as a more useful real
15We report here only results for the ￿lters with the quarterly smoothing parameters (￿ = 1600 for the HP
and ~ ￿ = 61:5 for the exponential), although we also experimented with the other approaches to the choice of
these values described in the previous section.
15indicator for monetary policy than the DSGE-HP output gap, as we can see by comparing
model ReNoGap to model HP. Finally, alternative approaches to the measurement of the
EIR, in which potential output is measured through a statistical ￿lter, and the equilibrium
real rate is one consistent with that notion of potential, do not fare nearly as well (models
RexpExp and RhpHP).
The reason for the success of speci￿cations that include re
t among the arguments of the
interest rate rule can be further appreciated from Figure 4, where we plot the posterior
distribution of re
t implied by the model. As we can see, the estimated re
t is a good business
cycle indicator over our sample. It drops sharply during recessions and rises over booms.
However, re
t conveys somewhat di⁄erent information than the HP output gap, which is also
reported in Figure 4: For example, re
t peaks earlier than the HP output gap before the
recessions of 1990 and of 2007, although the peaks coincide in the 2001 recession. Moreover,
the e¢ cient real rate is fairly stable above its mean in the mid-nineties, while the HP output
gap turns negative in 1995. These inferred movements in re
t mirror those in the e⁄ective
federal funds rate quite closely, helping to explain the empirical success of the Re policy
speci￿cation.
The close co-movement between the e⁄ective federal funds rate and the estimates of re
t,
which is depicted in Figure 5, raises the concern that the observations on the nominal interest
rate might be ￿explaining￿ the estimates of re
t, and not vice versa. This is not the case,
however, as demonstrated by the fact that we obtain almost identical estimates of the time
path of re
t in the baseline model, in which the e¢ cient real rate is not included in the policy
rule. The main di⁄erence between the two estimates is that the posterior distribution is
tighter when re
t enters the interest rate rule, as shown in Figure 6. This enhanced precision
of the estimates suggests that, indeed, the nominal interest rate carries useful information
on re
t in speci￿cation Re, as we would expect, but that this information does not distort the
inference on its average time-path.
Some intuition for the robustness of the estimates of re
t across models can be gleaned from
the expression for the e¢ cient rate of interest derived in section 2, which we report here for
convenience
re







If the log-deviations of e¢ cient output from the balanced growth path were a martingale (i.e.
Etye
t+1 = ye
t), this expression would imply that the e¢ cient real interest rate is the sum of
the forecastable movements in the growth rate of productivity ￿t and in the intertemporal
taste shock ￿t: In our estimated models, the deviations from the condition Etye
t+1 = ye
t are
￿small￿ , as are the forecastable movements in ￿t. The taste shock ￿t, on the contrary, is
16persistent, and its innovations are sizable, so that its forecastable movements tend to be
the main driving force of the movements in re
t.16 Moreover, the cyclical behavior of these
forecastable movements in ￿t is precisely and robustly pinned down in our estimates, with
little variation across speci￿cations. As a result, the inference on the evolution of the e¢ cient
real rate over time is remarkably consistent across all the models we consider.
4.3 A Time-Varying In￿ ation Target
In this section, we further enlarge the set of policy rules subject to our evaluation, by introduc-
ing a feature that is fairly common in the recent empirical DSGE literature: a time-varying
in￿ ation target (TVIT). This addition creates a new class of feedback rules, of the form
it = ￿it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)[r￿
t + ￿￿
t + ￿￿ (￿t ￿ ￿￿
t) + ￿xxt] + "i
t; (8)
where ￿￿
t is an exogenous AR(1) process that represents persistent deviations of the in￿ ation
target from its long-run value ￿￿.17 The motivation for considering this feature in the policy
rule is that it helps to capture the low-frequency movements in in￿ ation and the nominal
interest rate that are evident even in our relatively short sample. In particular, in￿ ation
hovered around 4% in the late 1980s, until the recession of the early 1990s contributed
to reduce it to its more recent range around 2%: This process of so-called opportunistic
disin￿ ation took until the middle of the decade to complete. One simple way of capturing the
central bank￿ s willingness to delay the achievement of its ultimate in￿ ation objective until
the ￿next￿recession, which is at the heart of the opportunistic approach to disin￿ ation, is to
allow smooth time-variation in its short-run in￿ ation target, as in speci￿cation (8).
When we allow for this type of time-variation in the best rule so far, rule Re, the ￿t
improves by another 15 points on Kass and Raftery￿ s (1995) likelihood ratio scale. This
improvement constitutes very strong evidence in favor of the inclusion of a time-varying
in￿ ation objective in the policy rule. With respect to the baseline, the marginal likelihood of
speci￿cation RePistar is 27 log-points higher. Moreover, speci￿cation RePistar, in which the
EIR is measured by the e¢ cient real rate and the output gap by the deviation of output from
its e¢ cient level, is the best-￿tting one among those with a time-varying in￿ ation objective,
as shown in Panels III and IV of Table 2.
16The important role of the intertemporal shock ￿t in reconciling this class of DSGE models with the
data is a manifestation of the well-known de￿ciencies of standard Euler equations in pricing returns, as ￿rst
documented by Hansen and Singleton (1982) and more recently re-emphasized in a DSGE context by Primiceri,
Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2006).
17The autocorrelation coe¢ cient of ￿
￿
t has a Beta prior tightly distributed around a mean of 0:95:
17Two more results from the table are worth emphasizing. First, the role of re
t remains crucial
even in the speci￿cations that include a TVIT. In fact, rule RePistar improves the model ￿t
by about 17 KR points with respect to the best-￿tting rule with a TVIT, but without the
equilibrium real rate among its arguments (rule PistarExp in Panel IV). The improvement
in ￿t is even larger (30 KR points) when rule RePistar is compared to a simple baseline
speci￿cation with a TVIT (rule Pistar), which is a more relevant comparison if we want to
isolate the marginal contribution of the EIR in the policy rule. Interestingly, this improvement
in performance is comparable to the one obtained when the EIR is included in the equivalent
speci￿cations with a constant in￿ ation target, i.e. when comparing the baseline rule to rule
Re. This result suggests that the e¢ cient real rate and a smoothly evolving in￿ ation target
enhance the empirical performance of the model through fairly independent channels and
should thus be complementary features in policy speci￿cations with good empirical properties.
Second, our ability to draw sharp conclusions on the most appropriate measure of the
output gap is complicated by the presence of a TVIT. For example, the deterioration in ￿t
when the output gap is measured through various statistical ￿lters, rather than in deviation
from the e¢ cient level of output, or even excluded from the policy rule altogether, as in rule
RePistarNoGap, is negligible. This latter result, in particular, might suggest that the e¢ cient
interest rate and a TVIT are all that is needed to account for the movements in the federal
funds rate, and that measures of output slack are redundant. However, this conclusion is
probably unwarranted, since there are fairly clear signs of weak identi￿cation of the output
gap coe¢ cient ￿x, especially in speci￿cation RePistar. This identi￿cation problem should not
be too surprising, since interest rate rules with a TVIT include at least three latent variables:
the in￿ ation target itself, the i.i.d. monetary policy shock and potential output.18 Drawing
sharp inferences on the contributions of these three factors to the movements in the interest
rate, therefore, is bound to be problematic, even though the structure of the model imposes
restrictions on the behavior of potential output. In fact, this consideration suggests that
similar problems are likely to persist even in richer models ￿at least as long as the in￿ ation
target is treated as an exogenous variable. Given the promising empirical performance of this
class of policy rules, these identi￿cation issues probably deserve further scrutiny.
18The equilibrium real rate is a fourth latent variable in some speci￿cations, but this does not appear to
worsen the identi￿cation challenge, since r
e
t is restricted to enter the intercept of the policy rule (i.e. to have
a coe¢ cient of one) and its evolution is pinned down fairly precisely by the demand side of the model.
184.4 Summary of Main Results
So far, we have surveyed the empirical performance of about 40 di⁄erent interest rate rules,
while trying to develop some leads on the sources of their successes and failures. This exercise
brought four main themes to our attention. First, the simplest and most natural extension
of the original Taylor (1993) rule to our DSGE framework, which we adopted as our baseline
policy speci￿cation, ￿ts the data extremely poorly, compared to most of the alternative spec-
i￿cations we have considered. Second, this poor performance can be improved signi￿cantly
if the model-implied e¢ cient output gap is substituted by an HP ￿lter as the measure of
economic slack in the policy rule. Simpler, one-sided ￿lters also perform better than the e¢ -
cient output gap, although worse than the HP ￿lter. Third, further signi￿cant improvements
in ￿t can be achieved by allowing the policy rate to respond to movements in the e¢ cient
real interest rate implied by the DSGE model. Documenting the empirical success of policy
rules with this feature is the main contribution of this paper, given the normative appeal of
these rules and the frequent discussion of the potential uses of measures of the equilibrium
real rate in the policy debate. Fourth, feedback rules in which the in￿ ation target evolves
smoothly over time perform best. However, tracking the e¢ cient real interest rate remains
an important feature even in this class of rules, suggesting that both these extensions to the
baseline speci￿cation should be standard in applied DSGE modeling.
In the next two sections, we investigate the extent to which these main themes survive
variations in the arguments of the policy rule, which have often appeared in the literature,
as well as in the model of the economy.
4.5 Robustness and the Best Rule
In this section, we conduct a series of robustness exercises that involve relatively small vari-
ations in the policy rule, but that result in speci￿cations commonly found in the literature.
We subject to these experiments only the best-￿tting rules within each class, to avoid an ex-
ponential proliferation of estimated models. In this process, we also discover the best-￿tting
rule among those we have estimated.
The ￿rst variation we consider replaces the contemporaneous values of in￿ ation and the
output gap in the interest rate rule with their rational expectations forecasts, as in Clarida,
Gal￿ and Gertler (2000), for instance. The resulting policy rule speci￿cations, and their ￿t,
are reported in Panel V of table 2. We emphasize two ￿ndings. First, the forward-looking
rules maintain the relative ranking of the broader classes of policy speci￿cations emphasized
above. For example, rules that include re
t and/or ￿￿
t ￿t better than rules without these factors
19and the evidence in their favor is still very strong. Second, the forward-looking speci￿cation
with re
t and ￿￿
t is preferred to its contemporaneous counterpart.
However, this result does not hold when the measure of in￿ ation we include in the feedback
rule is a four quarter moving average, rather than its quarterly value, as in Panel VI of table
2. Once again, the improvements in ￿t obtained by including re
t and ￿￿
t in the policy rule are
very similar to those documented before. The log marginal likelihood of rule RePistarPi4Q,
which includes both features, is 6 points higher than that of rule RePi4Q, in which the
in￿ ation target is constant, and about 23 points higher than that of rule Pi4Q, which has the
same structure as the baseline. In fact, rule RePistarPi4Q is the best-￿tting rule among the
55 analyzed in this paper.
Several features of this rule are worth emphasizing. First, the improvement in ￿t it
achieves over the baseline, 67 points on KR￿ s scale, is remarkable. The evidence in favor of
this rule against the equivalent version with quarterly in￿ ation is also very strong, although
of course much less decisive. Second, the best rule is a sensible blend of theoretical and
practical considerations. For example, most policymakers would agree that a four quarter
moving average of in￿ ation is a more reliable guide to in￿ ationary pressures than a quarterly
measure. On the other hand, they might object to the proxies for real economic developments
included in this rule, the e¢ cient real rate and output gap. Nevertheless, these measures
have the virtue of being linked directly to the objectives that monetary policy should pursue
according to the DSGE model and are thus appealing on theoretical grounds. Finally, the
posterior estimates of the model that embeds the best rule are all reasonable and do not point
to any obvious identi￿cation or other speci￿cation problem. This is true for the parameters
as well as for the latent variables that enter the policy rule, whose posterior distributions we
report in Figures 7 and 8.
Among the parameters, the slope of the Phillips curve, ￿; has a posterior mode of 0:05,
and a mean of 0:07, very close to the typical values in the literature. Both the indexation
parameter (￿) and the autocorrelation of the cost-push shock (￿u) are distributed around low
values, although both display a fairly long tail. This ￿nding depends on the fact that the
observed persistence in in￿ ation is well captured by the slow-moving in￿ ation target, whose
estimated autocorrelation (￿￿￿) has a mode of 0:99. Finally, the coe¢ cients on in￿ ation
(￿￿) and the output gap (￿x) in the Taylor rule have modes (and means) of 1:7 and 0:6;
respectively, both in line with most empirical estimates for this period, although the data do
not appear very informative on the latter coe¢ cient, as we already pointed out.
Turning now to the latent variables, Figure 8 shows that the posterior median of ￿￿
t
captures well the step-down in in￿ ation in the ￿rst few years of the sample, although the
20posterior uncertainty on the level of this target is very large. Of course, the estimates continue
to ￿ uctuate even in the second half of the sample. In fact, a dip occurs both around 2003 and
in the more recent period, at the same time as observed in￿ ation was falling. These movements
remind us that time-variation in the in￿ ation target is a useful statistical device but not a
substitute for a more structural analysis of the low-frequency movements in in￿ ation. The
second panel of the ￿gure depicts the posterior distribution of the e¢ cient real interest rate,
which is very similar to the one reported in Figure 5. This similarity con￿rms the robustness
of the inference on re
t across di⁄erent models. Finally, the third panel of the ￿gure reports
the posterior estimate of the e¢ cient output gap. Although the uncertainty on the level of
xe
t is large, its evolution over time is broadly consistent with the business cycle as identi￿ed
by the NBER, whose recessions are shaded in the picture.
4.6 A Medium-Scale DSGE Model
We conclude our investigation by evaluating the robustness of the results obtained so far
within a medium-scale DSGE model, along the lines of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). The exact speci￿cation we adopted for the private
sector behavior is the one in Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010), to which we refer
the reader for the details. Within this framework, we embed some of the best performing
and/or more popular rules in Table 2. We also take care to sample policy speci￿cations from
each of the families considered above to explore the extent to which the themes highlighted
in section 4.4 survive in this more elaborate environment.
Table 3 reports the results of this investigation and displays relative rankings from the
small model for reference. The ￿rst three columns of numbers, under the heading 3 observ-
ables, refer to estimations based on the same set of observables as in the small-scale model ￿
GDP growth, in￿ ation and the Federal Funds rate ￿and on the same sample. The rules we
considered are ordered from the best to the worst ￿tting in this estimation.
The results largely corroborate ￿ndings from the small model. First, the gap in marginal
likelihoods between the ￿rst and last rule is large, about 35 log-points, con￿rming that the
choice of the interest rate rule makes a di⁄erence in the ￿t of DSGE models. Second, the
baseline rule is at the bottom of the table and, as in the small model, the poor performance
of the baseline speci￿cation can be improved with an HP-￿ltered measure of the output gap.
Third, the best ￿tting rule from the small model, RePistarPi4Q, still performs well, ranking
among the top 5 rules from the JPT model (which are all within 6 log points of each other).
Fourth, speci￿cations that include the e¢ cient real interest rate in the intercept dominate the
top of the table. These rules are uniformly better than identical speci￿cations that exclude
21the e¢ cient real interest rate, which is a result that extends to forward-looking rules, as we
have found in the small model.
The only exception to this... ￿rule￿is the SW speci￿cation. This rule ranks 38 of 55 in
Table 2 while is very close to the top in the medium-scale model. In addition, its ￿t slightly
deteriorates when we add re
t in its intercept, suggesting that the unusual term in the growth
rate of the output gap ￿xt might act as a proxy for movements in the equilibrium real rate,
making the inclusion of the latter super￿ uous.
In fact, the SW rule is the best by a fairly large margin when we estimate the same model
with the more standard set of seven observables ￿including consumption, investment, hours
worked and wages ￿as in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti
(2010). The results of these estimations are reported in the last three columns of Table 3.
The ￿t achieved by the SW rule in the medium-scale model may not be too surprising, given
the excellent empirical performance of the model in Smets and Wouters (2007). What our
analysis adds to this knowledge is that the SW￿ s policy rule is an important contributor to
this performance.
Nonetheless, even under the estimation with seven observables, a policy rule that responds
both to a time-varying in￿ ation target, and to the e¢ cient real interest rate (RePistar),
ranks a relatively close second to the SW rule in terms of ￿t. This result con￿rms that these
two sources of time-variation in the intercept of the policy rule can improve a model￿ s ￿t
signi￿cantly, as we had found in the baseline speci￿cation. Unlike in the estimations with
three observables, though, the contribution of re
t is less clear-cut when the medium-scale
model is estimated with seven observables. In many instances, in fact, the inclusion of re
t in
a rule with otherwise given arguments worsens its ￿t. A more thorough investigation of the
reasons for this discrepancy between the model estimated with three and seven observables
might provide useful insights into this class of models, but lies beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Conclusions
The existing positive DSGE literature focuses an overwhelming share of its attention on
specifying the behavior of the private sector, while treating that of the central bank as
an afterthought. This state of a⁄airs is not too surprising, since reducing the real world
complexity of the private sector to ￿t into a macroeconomic model o⁄ers a vast menu of
modeling choices. In comparison, capturing the broad contours of the behavior of monetary
policy is certainly much easier and less controversial. Yet, paying virtually no attention
to this step in the speci￿cation of a general equilibrium model seems suboptimal, for at
22least two reasons. First, in the current vintage of monetary DSGE models, the systematic
response of policy to economic developments can have large e⁄ects on the equilibrium, as
demonstrated by the vast body of normative work in the ￿eld (see Woodford, 2010, for a
survey). Second, one of the main objectives of these models is to o⁄er a quantitative tool to
study the consequences of di⁄erent approaches to the conduct of monetary policy. This study
is complicated by the lack of systematic guidance on the extent to which di⁄erent plausible
policy rules, once embedded into a general equilibrium apparatus, enhance or detract from its
ability to account for the historical relations between the macroeconomic variables of interest.
This paper attempted to provide some of that guidance, by estimating a large set of interest
rate rules (55 in the current draft) in the context of a simple DSGE model, and comparing
their empirical ￿t. We can summarize what we learned from this exercise as follows. First,
the improvements in ￿t that can be achieved by a careful choice of the arguments of the
monetary policy rule, with respect to the speci￿cations more often used in the literature, are
very strong. Second, a robust feature of the best ￿tting rules is that they include a previously
unexplored factor among their arguments, namely the e¢ cient real interest rate ￿the rate of
return that would prevail in equilibrium if the economy were perfectly competitive. Third,
this feature remains empirically important in the now canonical medium-scale DSGE model
of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007); although the
generality of this result depends on the set of observable variables deployed to estimate the
model.
Of course, our results do not represent a de￿nitive guide to ￿good￿interest rate rules, for
at least two related reasons. First, the exact model speci￿cations we adopted matters. More
work on the results￿robustness across di⁄erent models would therefore be desirable. Second,
model comparison through marginal data densities and Bayes factors applied to DSGE models
is subject to some pitfalls, highlighted for example by Del Negro and Schorfheide (2010).
However, we hope to have at least contributed to narrowing signi￿cantly the set of rules that
researchers will entertain as empirically plausible in the future.
Going forward, we expect to devote some of our research to further scrutinize the role
of the e¢ cient real interest rate re
t as a useful explanatory factor for the movements in
nominal interest rates. In particular, we would like to better understand the origins of
this combination of shocks, which in our baseline simple model is largely a re￿ ection of the
empirical shortcomings of the intertemporal Euler equation, as captured by the presence of
the shock ￿t. Moreover, it would be interesting to explore more realistic assumptions on the
information available to policy makers when making their decisions, focusing in particular on
the fact that, unlike in our model, the e¢ cient real interest rate is not observable in practice.
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27A The Model
This appendix presents the microfoundations of the model.
A.1 Households
A continuum of households of measure one populates the economy. All households, indexed
by j 2 (0;1), discount the future at rate ￿ 2 (0;1) and have the same instantaneous utility


















The aggregate preference shock ￿t shifts the intertemporal allocation of consumption without
a⁄ecting the intratemporal margin between labor and leisure.19 We assume that ￿t follows a
stationary process with mean zero of the form
￿t = ￿￿￿t￿1 + "￿
t:
The consumption index C
j
t is a constant elasticity of substitution aggregator over di⁄er-














Households supply their specialized labor input for the production of a speci￿c ￿nal good.
As a consequence of labor market segmentation, the wage w
j
t di⁄ers across households. How-
ever, household j can fully insure against idiosyncratic wage risk by buying at time t state-
contingent securities D
j
t+1 at price Qt;t+1. Besides labor income, households earn after-tax
￿
j
















where pt (i) is the dollar price of the ith good variety.
19We could have also introduced a purely intratemporal shock a⁄ecting labor supply decisions only. However,
in our empirical implementation of the model, hours and wages are not included among the observables.
Therefore, such a shock would only a⁄ect the ￿ exible price level of output, making it indistinguishable from
a technology shock.
28A.2 Firms
Firm i produces the di⁄erentiated consumption good yt (i) with a linear production function
in labor
yt (i) = Atht (i): (10)






￿ + ￿￿￿t￿1 + "
￿
t : (11)
Firms take wages as given and sell their products in monopolistically competitive goods
markets, setting prices in a staggered fashion, as in Calvo (1983). Every period, independently
of previous adjustments, each ￿rm faces a probability (1 ￿ ￿) of optimally choosing its price.
The ￿ ￿rms that do not fully optimize in a given period adjust their price according to the
indexation scheme







where Pt is the aggregate price level consistent with the consumption aggregator (9) and we
allow for partial indexation to the long run central bank￿ s in￿ ation target ￿￿: In the event
of a price change at time t, ￿rm i chooses pt (i) to maximize the present discounted value of












e(1￿￿)￿￿(s￿t)yt;s (i) ￿ ws (i)hs (i)
#)
; (12)
subject to its production function (10) and the demand for its own good conditional on no







where Yt is an index of aggregate demand of the same form as (9).
A.3 Monetary Policy
The central bank sets the net nominal interest rate it with a certain degree of inertia in
response to departures of aggregate demand and in￿ ation from their respective objectives.






















and its average can be decomposed via the Fisher equation as R = er+￿￿
; which de￿nes the
steady state net real interest rate r: The continuously compounded nominal interest rate in
the text is de￿ned as it ￿ logRt:
B Statistical Filters in DSGE Models
This appendix illustrates how to embed a linear ￿lter into a dynamic rational expectation
model. We begin with a brief general description of linear ￿ltering problems. We then focus
on the application to the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) ￿lter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997).
B.1 Linear Filters
The objective of ￿￿ltering￿ is to decompose the stochastic process xt into two orthogonal
components
xt = yt + ~ xt;
where the process yt has power only in some frequency interval f(a;b) [ (￿a;￿b)g 2 (￿￿;￿).
Then, we can represent yt as
yt = B (L)xt;





Therefore, implementation of the ideal ￿lter requires an in￿nite dataset. We can think
about approximating the ideal ￿lter as a projection problem. Given a sample x = [x1;:::;xT],







where f = T ￿t and p = t￿1. The main problem of this estimates is that the B coe¢ cients
require knowledge of fx (!), the spectral density of x:
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) show that, for most macro variables, the coe¢ cients ob-
tained by assuming that x is a random walk work quite well. One approach to the calculation
of these coe¢ cients is then to ￿expand￿the available sample with the least squares optimal
guesses of the missing data at the beginning and end of the sample. For the random walk,
these data are just x1 and xT. Our proposal is to adopt the same philosophy (i.e. to ex-
pand the available dataset) in the context of our framework, using the rational expectations
forecasts of the missing data obtained from the model.20
B.2 Application to the HP Filter
In this section, we discuss the application of our methodology to the HP ￿lter. We focus
on the HP ￿lter because of its wide use in macroeconomics as a ￿ exible device (through the
choice of ￿) to draw a smooth trend through the data. The HP ￿lter provides a typical
example of a ￿traditional￿smooth measure of potential output and of the associated output
gap. Its added advantage in out context is that the expression for the ideal ￿lter is a relatively
simple function of lag polynomials. The result is a parsimonious (i.e. two leads and lags)
recursive representation, that requires only a modest expansion of the model￿ s state space.
The ideal HP ￿lter is of the form (e.g. Baxter and King, 1999)
HPg =
￿(1 ￿ L)2 (1 ￿ F)
2




1 + ￿(1 ￿ L)2 (1 ￿ F)
2
where HPg denotes the ￿lter whose application results in the ￿gap￿ , while HPt denotes the
￿lter whose application produces the trend.21 Practical application of these ￿lters requires an
20Watson (2007) proposes a similar procedure using unrestricted ARIMA processes as forecasting tools.
Julliard at al. (2006) is the only example we could ￿nd of an application to DSGEs models. The main
objective of all these papers is to improve the end-of-sample performance of the ￿lters they consider.
21King and Rebelo (1993) originally derived these expressions as the solution of a ￿smoothing￿ problem.
However, they also showed that this ￿lter, with ￿ = 1600, approximates very well a high pass ￿lter with cuto⁄
frequency ￿=16 or 32 quarters.
31approximation, since they embed a two-sided, in￿nite moving average of the data.22 However,
application of Christiano and Fitzgerald￿ s (2003) insight to a rational expectations context
allows us to use the ideal ￿lter directly, where the approximation relies on the substitution
of the in￿nite leads and lags implicit in HP (L) with rational expectation forecasts. In
particular, given observations on logGDPt = yt; we de￿ne the HP gap with parameter ￿ as
h





t = ￿(1 ￿ L)2 (1 ￿ F)
2 yt;
where now the forward and backward operators are de￿ned by
Lyt = yt￿1
Fyt = Etyt+1
as it is standard in rational expectations models (e.g. Blanchard and Fischer, 1989).
22 Details on this approximation can be found, for example, in Baxter and King (1999):
32C Tables
Parameter Prior Posterior
Distribution 5% Median 95% Mode 5% Median 95%
! G(1;0:2) 0.70 0.99 1.35 0.96 0.67 0.96 1.32
￿ G(0:1;0:05) 0.03 0.09 0.19 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.004
￿ B(0:6;0:2) 0.25 0.61 0.90 0.56 0.46 0.59 0.70
￿ B(0:6;0:2) 0.25 0.61 0.90 0.69 0.10 0.53 0.80
￿ B(0:7;0:15) 0.43 0.72 0.92 0.70 0.62 0.72 0.80
￿￿ N(1:5;0:25) 1.09 1.50 1.91 0.89 0.66 1.03 1.49
4￿x N(0:5;0:2) 0.17 0.50 0.83 1.19 0.97 1.21 1.45
400￿￿ N(2;1) 0.36 2.00 3.64 2.36 1.89 2.38 2.85
400ra N(2;1) 0.36 2.00 3.64 1.90 0.83 1.90 2.95
400￿a N(3;0:35) 2.42 3.00 3.58 2.94 2.48 2.94 3.40
￿￿ B(0:5;0:2) 0.17 0.50 0.83 0.92 0.87 0.92 0.95
￿￿ B(0:5;0:2) 0.17 0.50 0.83 0.56 0.29 0.53 0.72
￿u B(0:5;0:2) 0.17 0.50 0.83 0.11 0.06 0.32 0.71
￿￿ IG1(0:5;2) 0.17 0.34 1.24 1.23 0.95 1.37 2.04
￿￿ IG1(0:5;2) 0.17 0.34 1.24 2.05 1.34 2.13 3.02
￿u IG1(0:5;2) 0.17 0.34 1.24 0.53 0.19 0.43 0.60
￿i IG1(0:5;2) 0.17 0.34 1.24 0.27 0.23 0.30 0.39
Table 1: Prior and posterior marginal distributions for the paramaters in the baseline model.
G stands for Gamma, B stands for Beta, N stands for Normal and IG1 stands for Inverse
Gamma 1, with mean and standard deviation in parenthesis
33Rank Name Policy Rule logML 2(logBF)
47 Baseline ￿￿￿t+￿xxe
t -379.0 0.0








39 HP^ ￿ ￿￿￿t+￿xx
HP(^ ￿)
t -369.8 18.4
42 Growth ￿￿￿t+￿￿y￿yt -374.8 8.3
















52 NoGap ￿￿￿t -393.2 -28.3











































Table 2: Ranking of alternative policy rules. First column shows the overall ranking, the
second column the designation of the policy rule, the third column the long run component
of the policy rule equation (excluding the smoothing component), the fourth column the log
marginal likelihood and the ￿fth column the log of the Bayes factor. The table shows six
panels, corresponding to di⁄erent groups of policy rules.
34Rank Name Policy Rule logML 2(logBF)













































































































Table 2: (Continued) Ranking of alternative policy rules. First column shows the overall
ranking, the second column the designation of the policy rule, the third column the long
run component of the policy rule equation (excluding the smoothing component), the fourth
column the log marginal likelihood and the ￿fth column the log of the Bayes factor. The
table shows six panels, corresponding to di⁄erent groups of policy rules.
35Rank Name Policy Rule logML 2(logBF)





























































Table 2: (Continued) Ranking of alternative policy rules. First column shows the overall
ranking, the second column the designation of the policy rule, the third column the long
run component of the policy rule equation (excluding the smoothing component), the fourth
column the log marginal likelihood and the ￿fth column the log of the Bayes factor. The
table shows six panels, corresponding to di⁄erent groups of policy rules.
363 Observables 7 Observables
Name Rank logML 2(logBF) Rank logML 2(logBF)
RePistar 1 -11.6 65.9 3 -455.1 30.3
SW 2 -15.9 57.3 2 -443.4 53.7
SWRe 3 -16.3 56.5 10 -475.3 -10.0
ReEPiEx 4 -16.4 56.3 12 -496.0 -51.5
RePistarPi4q 5 -16.9 55.3 1 -442.1 56.4
Re 6 -17.2 54.6 16 -508.0 -75.5
RePi4QEx 7 -18.4 52.3 13 -497.0 -53.4
ReHP 8 -19.1 50.9 15 -506.4 -72.3
RePi4q 9 -19.7 49.7 17 -527.3 -113.9
Pi4qEx 10 -21.5 46.1 6 -462.2 16.2
ReGrowth4q 11 -21.9 45.4 14 -504.8 -69.0
Pi4q 12 -22.8 43.6 11 -477.3 -14.0
EPiEx 13 -31.3 26.6 5 -460.7 19.2
HP 14 -31.5 26.1 9 -472.1 -3.6
Pistar 15 -31.7 25.7 4 -457.6 25.3
Baseline 16 -44.6 0.0 8 -470.3 0.0
Growth4q 17 -46.3 -3.5 7 -465.7 9.2
Table 3: Select policy rules estimated with JPT (2010) model on three observables and
comparison with small model rankings. The ￿rst column shows the interest rate speci￿cation
name. The next three columns show the overall ranking, log marginal likelihood, and KR
criterion for the JPT model estimated on 3 observables. The latter three columns show the
same three statistics corresponding to estimates from the small model, where the ranking is















Figure 1: Prior and posterior distributions for ￿, ￿, ￿u, ￿￿, and ￿x under the baseline speci-
￿cation of interest rate rule: it = ￿it￿1 +(1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿￿t + ￿xxe
t)+"i
t. For each parameter, the














Figure 2: Prior and posterior distributions for ￿, ￿, ￿u, ￿￿, and ￿x under the HP speci￿cation






t. For each parameter, the solid
red line represents the prior while the blue histogram is the posterior.










Figure 3: Evolution of the model HP output gap (DSGE-HP) and empirical HP output gap
(Data-HP), all in percentage points. The blue continuous line and the shaded area around
it are the posterior median estimate of the model-based HP-￿ltered output gap xHP
t and the







The red dashed line is the cyclical component which results from applying the HP ￿lter on
the real GDP data used in the estimation. The black dash-dotted line is the output gap
produced by the CBO.












Figure 4: Evolution of model e¢ cient annualized real interest rate (re) and empirical HP out-
put gap (Data-HP), both in percentage points. The blue continuous line and the shaded area
around it are the posterior median estimate of the model e¢ cient real interest rate re
t and the
90% uncertainty bands when the interest rate rule is it = ￿it￿1+(1 ￿ ￿)(re
t + ￿￿￿t + ￿xxe
t)+
"i
t. The red dashed line is the cyclical component which results from applying the HP ￿lter
on the real GDP data used in the estimation.












Figure 5: Evolution of model e¢ cient real interest rate (re) and demeaned Federal Funds
Rate (FFR demeaned), both annualized and in percentage points. The blue continuous
line and the shaded area around it are the posterior median estimate of the model e¢ cient
real interest rate re and the 90% uncertainty bands when the interest rate rule is it =
￿it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(re
t + ￿￿￿t + ￿xxe
t) + "i
t. The red dashed line is the demeaned FFR (sample
mean equal to 4:5%).














Figure 6: Evolution of e¢ cient real interest rate (re) in baseline model (Baseline) versus
model with time-varying intercept (Re), both annualized and in percentage points. The blue
continuous line and the dashed blue lines around it are the posterior median estimate of the
model e¢ cient real interest rate re
t and the 90% uncertainty bands when the interest rate
rule is it = ￿it￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(re
t + ￿￿￿t + ￿xxe
t) + "i
t. The red continuous line and the dotted
red lines around it are the posterior median estimate of the model e¢ cient real interest rate
re
t and the 90% uncertainty bands around it when the interest rate rule is it = ￿it￿1 +




















Figure 7: Prior and posterior distributions for ￿, ￿￿
￿, ￿, ￿u, ￿￿, and ￿x under the RePistarPi4Q
















t. For each parameter, the solid red line represents the prior while the blue histogram is the
posterior.



















Figure 8: Evolution of in￿ ation target (￿￿
t), e¢ cient real interest rate (re), and e¢ cient
output gap (xe
















t. In￿ ation and interest rate are annualized
and all are shown in percentage points. The blue continuous lines and the shaded areas
around them are the posterior median estimates and the 90% uncertainty bands.
45